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Abstract
We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a
completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strate-
gic contexts. These bounds are based on the convexity properties of
the range of utility vectors associated to all possible divisions of the
good. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact
value up to any fixed degree of precision.
1 Introduction
The notion of what is fair in the allocation of one or more infinitely divisible
goods to a finite number of agents with their own preferences has long been
debated. Predictably, no agreement has been reached on the subject. The
situation is often exemplified with children (players) at a birthday party
who are around a table waiting for their slice of the cake to be served, with
the help of some parent (an impartial referee). If we think about a special
class of resolute children who are able to specify their preferences in terms
of utility set functions, the parent in charge of the division could ease his
task by using a social welfare function to summarize the children’s utility
values. Among the many proposals, the maxmin – or Rawlsian – division
was extensively studied in the seminal work of Dubins and Spanier [10],
who showed the existence of maxmin optimal partitions of the cake for any
completely divisible cake and their main properties. They also showed that
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when a condition of mutual appreciation holds (assumption (MAC) below)
any optimal partition is also equitable, i.e., it assigns the same level of utility
for each child.
The study of the maxmin optimal partitions and their properties has
continued in more recent years. In particular, its relationship with other
important notions such as efficiency (or Pareto optimality) and, above all,
envy-freeness has been investigated with alternating success: each maxmin
partition is efficient, but while for the two children case Brams and Taylor
[6] showed that it is also envy-free, the same may not hold when three or
more children are to be served, as shown in Dall’Aglio and Hill [9].
It is worth pointing out the relationship with n player bargaining solu-
tions. If we think about the division as deriving from a bargaining procedure
among children, it is straightforward to show that the bargaining solution
proposed by Kalai [12], in the case where all the players’ utilities are nor-
malized to 1, coincides with the equitable maxmin division. Therefore, if the
conditions proposed by Dubins and Spanier hold, the two solutions actually
coincide.
Little attention has been devoted, however, to finding optimal maxmin
partitions with one notable exceptions: the case of two players with additive
and linear utility over several goods has been considered by Brams and Taylor
[6], with the Adjusted Winner procedure.
For the case of general preferences (expressed as probability measures, i.e.
nonnegative and countably additive set functions normalized to 1) and arbi-
trary number of players, Legut and Wilczinski [17] gave a characterization of
the optimal maxmin allocation in terms of weighted density functions. More-
over, Elton et al. [11] and Legut [14] provided lower bounds on the maxmin
value. The optimization problem was later analysed by Dall’Aglio [7]. The
general problem was reformulated as the minimization of a convex function
with a particular attention to the case where the maxmin allocation is not
equitable and the allocation of the cake occurs in stages to subsets of players.
No detail, however, was given on how to proceed with the minimization.
In most of the fair division literature, little is assumed about the strate-
gic behaviour of the children. Brams and Taylor [6] discuss the issue of the
manipulability of the preferences: in most cases children may benefit from
declaring false preferences. A different approach takes into account the pos-
sibility for the children to form coalitions after (Legut [15] and Legut et al.
[16]) or before (Dall’Aglio et al. [8]) the division of the cake. In both cases
coalitional games are defined and analysed. In the case of early cooperation
among children, the game is based on a maxmin allocation problem among
coalitions, each one having a joint utility function and a weight. The first
properties of the game are studied in [8]. It turns out that the analysis of
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the game is made harder by the difficulties in computing the characteristic
function, i.e., the value associated to each coalition. The tools we introduce,
therefore, become essential in computing such values, as well as any synthetic
value, such as the Shapley value, associated to the game.
The coalitional maxmin problem is indeed a generalization of the classical
maxmin problem introduced by Dubins and Spanier. Therefore, we consider
a common approach to set up an algorithm which, at each step, will compute
an approximating allocation, together with lower and upper bounds for the
maxmin value. The algorithm is based on a subgradient method proposed
by Shor [19] and it yields an approximation of the optimal allocation with
any fixed degree of precision.
In Section 2 we describe the maxmin fair division problem with coali-
tions through the strategic model of interaction among players in [8] and
the geometrical setting employed in [1], [2] and [7]. In Section 3 we present
the upper and the lower bounds for the objective value. In Section 4 we fit
the Subgradient Method to our problem and we derive a procedure where
the optimal value and the optimal partition are computed up to a desired
precision and we provide a numerical example where we describe two fair di-
vision games and we compute the corresponding Shapley values. Some final
considerations are given in Section 5.
2 The model and the maxmin fair division
problem with coalitions
We represent our completely divisible good as the set C, a Borel subset
of Rn, and we denote as B(C) the Borel σ−algebra of subsets of C. Let
N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players, whose preferences on the good are
µ1, . . . , µn, where each µi, i ∈ N, is a probability measures on (C,B(C)).
By the Radon-Nikodym theorem, if v is a non-negative finite-valued measure
with respect to which each µi is absolutely continuous (for instance we may
consider v =
∑
i∈N µi), then, for each A ∈ B(C),
µi(A) =
∫
A
fidv ∀ i ∈ N,
where fi is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µi with respect to v.
We will consider the following assumptions:
a) complete divisibility of the good (CD): For each i ∈ N and each A ∈ B(C)
such that µi(A) > 0, there exists a measurable set B ⊂ A such that
µi(A ∩B) > 0 and µi(A ∩Bc) > 0.
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b) mutual absolutely continuity (MAC): If there exists i ∈ N and A ∈ B(C)
such that µi(A) > 0, then for each j 6= i µj(A) > 0.
c) relative disagreement (RD): For each pair i, j ∈ N and each A ∈ B(C)
such that µi(A) > 0 and µj(A) > 0, there exists a measurable set
B ⊂ A such that µi(B)
µi(A)
6= µj(B)
µj(A)
.
Throughout the rest of the work we will assume that (CD) always holds,
while (MAC ) and (RD) are useful, though restrictive, assumptions that we
will employ only when strictly needed.
For any h ∈ N, let (A1, . . . , Ah) be an h-partition, i.e., a partition of
the good C into h measurable sets. Let Πh be the class of all h-partitions.
How do players behave in the division procedure? In the simplest case, each
player competes with the others to get a part of the cake with no strategic
interaction with other players. Each (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn determines a division
of the good in which player i, i ∈ N gets the share Ai with value µi(Ai). Here,
individual players seek an allocation with values as high as possible. A fair
compromise between the conflicting interests is given by maxmin allocation
(A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n) ∈ Πn that achieves
vm := max
(A1,...,An)∈Πn
{
min
i∈N
µi(Ai)
}
. (1)
Here vm denotes the maxmin value in the classical fair division problem.
With a completely divisible good, the allocation (A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n) is fair (or
proportional), i.e. µi(A
∗
i ) ≥ 1n for all i ∈ N. Moreover, if (MAC ) holds, it is
also egalitarian, i.e. µi(A
∗
i ) = µj(A
∗
j) for all i, j ∈ N (see [10]). Therefore,
under this assumption, an optimal allocation is also the bargaining solution
proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky [13] (see also Kalai [12]).
Dall’Aglio et al. [8] proposed a strategic model of interaction, where play-
ers, before the division takes place, gather into mutually disjoint coalitions.
Within each coalition, players pursue an efficient allocation of their collective
share of the cake.
Let G be the family of all partitions of N and, for each Γ ∈ G, let |Γ| = m,
m ≤ n, and let M = {1, . . . ,m} be the coalitions indexes set. Thus, players
cluster into coalitions specified by the partition Γ = {S1, . . . , Sm}. For each
j ∈M and each coalition Sj, players state their joint preferences as follows
µSj(B) = max{Di}i∈Sj partition of B
∑
i∈Sj
µi(Di) =
∫
B
fSj(x)dx (2)
with fSj(x) = maxi∈Sj fi(x), B ∈ B(C) and {Di}i∈Sj ∈ B(C). The utility
µSj(B) of coalition Sj will be divided among its members in a way that
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prevents any of them to break the coalition in search of a better deal. Once
the global coalition structure is known, a fair allocation of the cake among
the competing coalitions is sought. In this context, assigning the same value
to all coalitions could yield an unfair outcome. Fairness here must consider
the different importance that coalitions may assume and this is taken into
account by a weight function w : 2N → R+.
In this framework, each coalition takes the role of a single player in Equa-
tion (1). Following Kalai [12], when coalitions in Γ are formed and the weight
function w is considered, players should agree on a division of the cake which
achieves the following value
v(Γ, w) = max
(B1,...,Bm)∈Πm
{
min
j∈M
µSj(Bj)
w(Sj)
}
. (3)
Each coalition can evaluate its performance in the division by considering
the following coalitional game
η(S,w) = w(S)v(ΓS, w) S ⊆ N (4)
where ΓS = {S, {j}j /∈S}. The value η(S,w) can be interpreted as the minimal
utility that coalition S is going to receive in the division when the system of
weight w is enforced, independently of the behaviour of the other players.
A crucial question lies in the definition of the weight system. We consider
two proposals:
• wcard = |S|, S ⊂ N . This is certainly the most intuitive setting. Al-
though very natural, this proposal suffers from a serious drawback,
since players participating in the game η(·, w) may be better off wait-
ing to seek for cooperation well after the cake has been divided (see
[8]);
• wpre = µS (∪i∈SA∗i ), S ⊂ N , where (A∗1, A∗2, . . . , A∗n) is the partition
maximizing (1). By seeking early agreements among them, players
will be better off than postponing such agreements until the cake is
cut. The above mentioned problem is overcome at the cost of a less
intuitive (and more computationally challenging) formulation (see [8]).
It is interesting to note that to find these weights we need to solve (1).
It is easy to verify that, for each S ⊆ N ,
η(S,wcard) ≤ η(S,wpre)
with equality if S = N or S = {i} where i ∈ N .
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The optimization problem (3) can be seen as an infinite dimensional as-
signment problem. In principle we could attribute any point of the cake C to
any of the participating players (provided certain measurability assumptions
are met). For very special instances this becomes a linear program: when
the preferences have piecewise constant densities, or when the cake is made
of a finite number of completely divisible and homogeneous parts.
The fully competitive value vm is a special instance of the cooperative
case, since vm = v(Γ1, w1), with Γ1 = {{1}, . . . , {n}} and w1({i}) = 1 for
each i ∈ N . Therefore, we focus on the cooperative case alone.
2.1 A geometrical setting
We now describe a geometrical setting already employed in [1], [2], [7] and [14]
to explore fair division problems. In what follows we consider the weighted
preferences and densities, µwj and f
w
j , given respectively by
µwj =
µSj
w(Sj)
fwj =
fSj
w(Sj)
.
The partition range, also known as Individual Pieces Set (IPS) (see [2]) is
defined as
P := {(µw1 (B1), . . . , µwm(Bm)) : (B1, . . . , Bm) ∈ Πm} ⊂ Rm+ .
Let us consider some of its features. Each point p ∈ P is the image, un-
der (µ1, . . . , µn), of an m-partition of C. Moreover, P is compact and, if
(CD) holds, P is also convex (see [18]). Therefore, v(Γ, w) = max {x > 0 :
(x, x, . . . , x) ∩ P 6= ∅}. So, the point v(Γ, w) is the intersection between the
Pareto frontier of P and the egalitarian line
` = {x ∈ Rm : x1 = x2 = . . . = xm}. (5)
3 Upper and lower bounds for the maxmin
value
We turn our attention to a simpler optimization problem that may have an
unfair solution, but it provides easy-to-compute upper and lower bounds for
the original problem. These bounds depend on a weighted maxsum partition,
which we can derive through a straightforward extension of a result by Dubins
and Spanier [10]. Let ∆m−1 denote the unit (m− 1)−simplex.
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Proposition 3.1. (see [10, Theorem 2], [7, Proposition 4.3]) Let α ∈ ∆m−1
and let Bα = (Bα1 , . . . , B
α
m) be an m−partition of C. If
αkf
w
k (x) ≥ αhfwh (x) for all h, k ∈M and for all x ∈ Bαk , (6)
then
(Bα1 , . . . , B
α
m) ∈ argmax
(B1,...,Bm)∈Πm
m∑
j=1
αjµ
w
j (Bj). (7)
The value of this maxsum problem is itself an upper bound for problem
(3). For each choice of α ∈ ∆m−1, we have a maxsum partition Bα =
(Bα1 , . . . , B
α
m) corresponding to α.
Definition 3.2. The partition value vector (PVV) uα = (uα1 , . . . , u
α
m) is
defined by
uαj = µ
w
j (B
α
j ), for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
The PVV uα is a point where the hyperplane
∑m
j=1 αjxj = k touches the
partition range P , so uα lies on the Pareto border of P . Moreover, for any
α ∈ ∆m−1 there exists at least one PVV (see [2]). We are ready to state the
first approximation result.
Proposition 3.3. Let g : ∆m−1 → R+ be as follows:
g(α) :=
∫
C
max
j∈M
{αjfwj (x)}dx.
Then,
v(Γ, w) ≤ g(α) ≤ max
j∈M
uαj .
Proof. Following [7, Proposition 4.3] we know that the hyperplane that touches
P at the point uα is defined by the equation∑
i∈M
αixi = g(α)
Since α ∈ ∆m−1, this hyperplane intersects the egalitarian line ` defined in (5)
at the point (g(α), . . . , g(α)). Since the hyperplane is located above P , this
point lies above the maxmin point with coordinates (v(Γ, w), . . . , v(Γ, w)).
Therefore
g(α) ≥ v(Γ, w)
Finally, since g(α) is a weighted average of the values (uα1 , . . . , u
α
m), it
follows that g(α) ≤ maxj∈M uαj .
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The function g was already considered in [7], where it was shown that g
is convex, and v(Γ, w) = minα∈∆m−1 g(α).
We now turn our attention to a lower bound for v(Γ, w). Although we
will see later only one PVV is enough to assure such a bound, we give a
general result for the case where several PVVs have already been computed.
We derive the second approximation result through a convex combination of
these easily computable points in P , which lie close to v(Γ, w). The following
result generalizes Theorem 3 in [14] and Theorem 1.1 in [11].
Proposition 3.4. Let u = (u1, . . . , um) a partition value vector such that
uh = max
j=1,...,m
uj. (8)
Then,
v(Γ, w) ≥ v(u) := uh
1 +
∑
j 6=h
uh−uj
µwj (C)
≥ min
j∈M
uj. (9)
Proof. Let us consider the following vectors
eq = (0, . . . , 0, µwq (C), 0, . . . , 0) q ∈M q 6= h, (10)
where µwq (C) is the weighted joint utility of the whole cake by coalition Sq.
Now, consider the convex hull of the PVV u and the m− 1 points eq, q 6= h,
V := {thu+
∑
q 6=h
tqe
q : (th, . . . , tm) ∈ ∆m−1}
The lower bound we are looking for is the intersection point between V and
the egalitarian line ` from (5) (see Figure 1). Let us denote this point as
(xw, . . . , xw). Without loss of generality, let us suppose h = 1. Then, we
obtain (xw, . . . , xw) as follows:
t1u1 + 0 + . . .+ 0 = xw
t1u2 + t2µ
w
2 (C) + . . .+ 0 = xw
...
t1um + 0 + . . .+ tmµ
w
m(C) = xw
t1 + t2 + . . .+ tm = 1
We are dealing with a linear system with m + 1 unknown quantities,
t1, t2, . . . , tm, xw.
Thus, by Cramer’s rule, we get xw as
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xw =
det

u1 0 . . . 0 0
u2 µ
w
2 (C) . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
um 0 . . . µ
w
m(C) 0
1 1 . . . 1 1

det

u1 0 . . . 0 −1
u2 µ
w
2 (C) . . . 0 −1
...
...
...
...
...
um 0 . . . µ
w
m(C) −1
1 1 . . . 1 0

=
u1
∏
q 6=1 µ
w
q (C)
det

0 1 1 . . . 1
−1 u1 0 . . . 0
−1 u2 µw2 (C) . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
−1 um 0 . . . µwm(C)

=
u1
∏
q 6=1 µ
w
q (C)∏
q 6=1 µ
w
q (C) +
∑
q 6=1
∏
i 6=q,1 µ
w
i (C)(u1 − uq)
=
u1
∏
q 6=1 µ
w
q (C)∏
q 6=1 µ
w
q (C)
[
1 +
∑
q 6=1
(u1−uq)
µwq (C)
] = u1
1 +
∑
q 6=1
(u1−uq)
µwq (C)
,
where the second equality derives by suitable exchanges of rows and columns
in the denominator matrix. In fact, we get the second one after an even
number of exchanges on the first: m successive exchanges of the last row
until it reach the first position, and m successive exchanges of the last column
until it reach the first position. So the two matrices in the denominator have
the same determinant. It is easy to verify that ti > 0, for every i ∈ N .
Finally, since the lower bound belongs to the convex hull of the PVV u
and the m− 1 vectors eq, q 6= h, it is not less than the minimum component
of each vector, in particular v(u) ≥ minj∈M uj.
An illustration of the position of the bounds with respect to the partition
range in the case of two coalitions is shown in Figure 1.
4 The subgradient method
In the previous section we have seen that for each choice of the coefficients
vector α we can derive upper and lower bounds for v(Γ, w). We describe a
way of improving the coefficients α so that eventually the bounds will shrink
to the desired value.
Since in general g is a non-differentiable convex function, we can rely
on a simple minimizing algorithm developed by Shor [19], the subgradient
9
Figure 1: Upper and lower bounds for the two-coalition case.
method. In particular, since the domain of g is constrained, we must consider
an extension, the projected subgradient method, which solves constrained
convex optimization problems. Let us start by describing the method through
some basic definitions and the essential convergence result.
Definition 4.1. Let D be a closed convex set and let || · || be the Euclidean
norm. The projection of z ∈ Rn on D is denoted by p(z) and it is defined as
p(z) = argmin
x∈D
||x− z||. (11)
Definition 4.2. Let f be a convex function with domain D and let x0 an
interior point of D. A vector γ(x0) is called a subgradient or a generalized
gradient of f at x0 if it satisfies
f(x)− f(x0) ≥ 〈γ(x0), x− x0〉 for all x ∈ D. (12)
Moreover, γ is a bounded subgradient of f if there exists G ∈ R+ such
that ||γ(x)|| ≤ G for all x ∈ D.
We denote as ∂xf(x) the set of subgradients of a convex function f at
any interior point x of the f domain.
Definition 4.3. A sequence {st}+∞t=0 of positive numbers is called diminishing
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step size rule if it satisfies the conditions:
lim
t→+∞
st = 0, (13)
+∞∑
t=0
st = +∞. (14)
The subgradient method minimizes a non-differentiable convex function
which has a bounded set of minimum points and at least one bounded sub-
gradient. This procedure returns a minimum value for the function moving
a point in the domain in the opposite direction of a bounded subgradient by
a step belonging to a diminishing step size rule (see [19]). If the domain of
the function is constrained, then the point is projected in the domain (see
[5]). We recall the general result
Proposition 4.4. (see [5], [19]) Let f be a convex function defined on D ⊆
Rm, which has a bounded set of minimum points D∗ and let γ(x) ∈ ∂xf(x)
be a bounded subgradient. Moreover, let {st}+∞t=0 be a diminishing step size
rule. Then for any x0 ∈ D the sequence {xt}+∞t=0 generated according to the
formula
xt+1 = p[xt − stγ(xt)] (15)
has the following property: either an index t∗ exists such that xt
∗ ∈ D∗, or
limt→+∞ f tbest − f ∗ = 0, where
f tbest = min
i=1,...,t
f(xt) and f ∗ = min
x∈D
f(x).
Let us check that g can be minimized through the projected subgradient
method. First of all, g is convex with minα∈∆m−1 g(α) = v(Γ, w) (see [7]) and
we can easily show that uα ∈ ∂αg(α), with uα bounded. In fact, for each
point α˜ ∈ ∆m−1 the vector uα˜ satisfies (12):
g(α)− g(α˜) = max
B∈Πm
∑
j∈M
αjµ
w
j (Bj)− 〈uα˜, α˜〉
≥
∑
j∈M
αjµ
w
j (B
α˜
j )− 〈uα˜, α˜〉
= 〈uα˜, α〉 − 〈uα˜, α˜〉
= 〈uα˜, α− α˜〉.
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We now adapt the general updating rule (15) to our situation. For any
diminishing step size rule {st}+∞t=0 and any vector αt ∈ ∆m−1 of coefficients,
the update rule becomes
αt+1 = p[αt − stut] = (αt − stut + λ1)+ (16)
where λ ∈ R is the normalizing constant such that
m∑
i=1
(αti − stuti + λ)+ = 1.
Suppose now that αt ∈ ◦∆m−1 and that the step size st is sufficiently small to
guarantee
αti − stuti + λ > 0 for each i ∈M. (17)
Here λ has to be chosen so that
m∑
i=1
(αti − stuti + λ) = 1,
i.e.,
m∑
i=1
αti − st
m∑
i=1
uti +mλ = 1,
hence
λ = stu¯
t,
where u¯t =
∑m
i=1 u
t
i
m
is the average of the subgradient vector components. In
what follows we will make sure to choose a diminshing step size rule small
enough so that (17) is verified, or, equivalently,
αti − st(utt − u¯t) > 0 for all t ∈ N and for all i = 1, . . . ,m. (18)
We are now able to state the first convergence result.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose (CD) and (MAC) holds. Let ∆∗m−1 be the bounded
set of minimum points for g and let {st}+∞t=0 be a diminishing step size rule.
Then, there exists another diminishing step size rule s
′
t ≤ st which satisfies
(18). Consequently, given α0 ∈ ∆m−1 and the recursive sequence
ut = PV V (αt)
αt+1 = αt − s′t(ut − u¯t) (19)
either αt
∗ ∈ ∆∗m−1 for some t∗ ∈ N, or
lim
t→+∞
αt = α∗ ∈ ∆∗m−1 and lim
t→+∞
g(αt) = g(α∗) = v(Γ, w).
12
Proof. First of all, notice that constraint (18) involves only those indexes
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for which uti > u¯t. Let be It the set of those indexes in the
step t. For each of them we would get
st <
αti
uti − u¯t
=
mαti
(m− 1)uti −
∑
j 6=i u
t
j
.
Now, fix an arbitrary integer K ∈ N and define
τt =
K − 1
K
min
i∈It
{
mαti
(m− 1)uti −
∑
j 6=i u
t
j
}
.
Hence, let us define
s
′
t = min{st, τt}.
Thus, s
′
t satisfies (18) and (13), since limt→+∞ s
′
t = limt→+∞ st = 0.
To show (14), let us suppose
∑+∞
t=0 s
′
t < +∞. This implies for some i∗ ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and some sequence {tr} ⊂ N
lim
tr→+∞
mαtri∗
(m− 1)utri∗ −
∑
j 6=i∗ u
tr
j
= 0.
Since (m− 1)utri∗ −
∑
j 6=i∗ uj
tr > 0, taking a further subsequence {tp} ⊂ {tr}
we have
α
tp
i∗ → α˜i∗ = 0, so
∑
j 6=i∗
α
tp
j →
∑
j 6=i∗
α˜j = 1, and
u
tp
j → u˜j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
with (m− 1)u˜i∗ >
∑
j 6=i∗
u˜j. (20)
By continuity, u˜ = (u˜1, . . . , u˜m) lies on the upper surface of P , so∑
j∈M
u˜j ≥ 1. (21)
Moreover, u˜ is supported by the hyperplane
∑m
j=1 α˜jxj = k.
By (20) and (21) we have that u˜i∗ ≥ 1m > 0, since
(m− 1)u˜i∗ >
∑
j 6=i∗
u˜j =
∑
j∈M
u˜j − u˜i∗ ≥ 1− u˜i∗ , so
u˜i∗ ≥ 1
m
> 0.
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Now, the coexistence of u˜i∗ > 0 and α˜i∗ = 0 clashes with the hypoth-
esis (MAC). In fact, (u˜1, . . . , u˜m) ∈ argmaxx∈P
∑
j∈M α˜jxj,
∑
j∈M α˜ju˜j =∑
j 6=i∗ α˜ju˜j = k and there is no (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ P for which
∑
j∈M α˜xj > k.
Since u˜i∗ ≥ 1m > 0, there exists A˜i∗ such that u˜i∗ = µi∗(A˜i∗) ≥ 1m . By
(MAC) we can derive a partition from A˜i∗ of (m− 1) subsets {Bj}j 6=i∗ , with
∪j 6=i∗Bj = A˜i∗ and Bj ∩ Bl = ∅ if j 6= l, such that µj(Bj) ≥ ε > 0 for all
j 6= i∗.
If we consider the partition ˜˜A defined as ˜˜Ai∗ = ∅, ˜˜Aj = A˜j ∪Bj, we get∑
j∈M
α˜jµj(
˜˜Aj) =
∑
j 6=i∗
α˜j(µj(A˜i∗) + µj(Bj)) = k + (m− 1)ε > k,
which is a contradiction.
The final statement is a direct consequence of Propositions 3.3, 4.4 and
of the fact that if s′t → 0 then the sequence {αt} must converge to some α∗ ∈
∆∗m−1. Moreover, by the dominated convergence theorem, g(α
t) → g(α∗) =
v(Γ, w), last equality being again a consequence of Proposition 3.3.
To prove the convergence of the PVVs and of the lower bound, we assume
relative disagreement (RD).
Proposition 4.6. Suppose (CD), (MAC) and (RD) hold. Then, for any
α0 ∈ ∆m−1 and the recursive sequence (19), one of the following two condi-
tions hold:
• either ut∗ = (v(Γ, w), . . . , v(Γ, w)) for some t∗ ∈ N and v(ut∗) =
v(Γ, w),
• or limt→+∞ ut = (v(Γ, w), . . . , v(Γ, w)) and v(ut)→ v(Γ, w).
Proof. By (RD) we have that for any point on Pareto border of P there
exists one and only one hyperplane touching P (see [2]). By the conclusions
of Proposition 4.5 either αt
∗ ∈ ∆∗m−1 or limt→+∞ αt = α∗ ∈ ∆∗m−1.
In the first case, there exists only one PVV ut
∗
corresponding to αt
∗
. Since
the hyperplane with coefficients vector αt
∗
touches the partition range P in
the point corresponding to the maxmin allocation, then ut
∗
must coincide
with
u∗ = (v(Γ, w), . . . , v(Γ, w)). (22)
Also v(u∗) = v(Γ, w). In fact, all the coordinates of u∗ are equal and, there-
fore, maximal. Without loss of generality we choose u1 as maximal, and
v(u∗) =
u1
1 +
∑
j 6=1
u1−uj
µwj (C)
= u1 = v(Γ, w)
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the last equality holding by (22).
In the second occurrence, suppose on the contrary that αt
∗ → α∗ while
ut 9 u∗. Since the sequence {ut} is in a compact set, there must be a
converging subsequence ut
′ → u˜ 6= u∗. The vector u˜ is a second PVV asso-
ciated to α∗, but this is ruled out by (RD). Thus, limt→+∞ ut = u∗, and, by
continuity, limt→+∞ v(ut) = v(u∗) = u∗.
4.1 The algorithm
We now present two versions of an algorithm for the maxmin division prob-
lem. The common initializing elements for both versions are listed in Table 1.
The first version computes upper and lower bounds for v(Γ, w) and updates
the coefficient vector α through the subgradient rule (16). Both bounds are
updated by means of a simple comparison with the old ones. The generic
step is described in Table 2. A simpler but slower version, described in Table
3, computes the approximating optimal partition as well as the value. The
finiteness of both algorithms is guaranteed by Propositions 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
Particular care is needed in choosing the step sequence {st}+∞t=0 . A se-
quence converging too fast to 0 may lead to an increase in the number of
steps needed, since the step may soon become too small to reach the opti-
mum. Similarly a sequence converging too slowly may result in values of α
(and of the corresponding PVV’s) jumping from one extreme to the other
of the unit simplex (and of the partition range for the PVV’s). This, again,
will slow the convergence process.
Table 1: Description and initialization algorithms elements.
Elements Description Initialization
α supporting hyperplane coefficients vector α0j = 1/m, j ∈M
u PVV vector associated to α u0 = uα
0
ub upper bound g(α0)
lb lower bound v(u0)
s
′
t diminishing step size rule s
′
0 = min{s0, τ0}
4.2 A five players example
Let us consider the coalitional game defined in (4), with five players and
players’ preferences listed as probability distributions on C = [0, 1] in Table
4.
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Table 2: Generic step t for algorithm returning v(Γ, w).
Step t Computation
update α αt = αt−1 − s′t(ut−1 − u¯t−1)
update u ut = PV V (αt)
update ub if g(αt) < ub, then ub = g(αt)
update lb if v(ut) > lb, then lb = v(ut)
stop condition if ub− lb < ε, then STOP. Else, repeat the step.
Table 3: Generic step t for algorithm returning u∗.
Step t Computation
update α αt = αt−1 − s′t(ut−1 − u¯t−1)
update u ut = PV V (αt)
stop condition if maxj∈M utj − minj∈M utj < ε, then STOP. Else, repeat
the step.
In Figure 2, we represent the initial densities (a) and then the maxmin
partition for the fully competitive context (b), where Γ = {{i}i∈N} and
w({i}) = 1, for all i ∈ N.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
(a) Densities of preferences.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
3
4
(b) Maxmin partition.
Figure 2: Densities of players preferences and maxmin partition in competitive context
(red for player 1, green for player 2, blue for player 3, brown for player 4, purple for player
5).
For any S ⊆ N , we run our algorithm enforcing the two weight systems
wcard and wpre, with a tolerance of 10
−3 and we compute the corresponding
game values (Table 5). Consequently, in Table 6, we compute the Shapley
value for each game.
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Table 4: Players preferences.
Player {i} µi
1 Beta(2, 5)
2 Beta(3, 8)
3 Beta(7, 2)
4 Beta(10, 10)
5 Uniform[0, 1]
Table 5: Comparison between the coalitional game values.
Coalition S η(S,wcard) η(S,wpre)
{i}, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 404 0, 404
{1, 2} 0, 822 0, 842
{1, 3} 0, 835 0, 836
{1, 4} 0, 844 0, 861
{1, 5} 0, 819 0, 827
{2, 3} 0, 820 0, 820
{2, 4} 0, 826 0, 826
{2, 5} 0, 828 0, 833
{3, 4} 0, 808 0, 808
{3, 5} 0, 926 1, 040
{4, 5} 0, 886 1, 004
{1, 2, 3} 1, 262 1, 280
{1, 2, 4} 1, 273 1, 302
{1, 2, 5} 1, 256 1, 265
{1, 3, 4} 1, 275 1, 289
{1, 3, 5} 1, 392 1, 465
{1, 4, 5} 1, 366 1, 427
{2, 3, 4} 1, 242 1, 241
{2, 3, 5} 1, 389 1, 474
{2, 4, 5} 1, 349 1, 414
{3, 4, 5} 1, 403 1, 625
{1, 2, 3, 4} 1, 706 1, 727
{1, 2, 3, 5} 1, 877 1, 903
{1, 2, 4, 5} 1, 841 1, 862
{1, 3, 4, 5} 1, 968 2, 044
{2, 3, 4, 5} 1, 940 2, 032
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 2, 477 2, 477
The two games share the same ranking for the Shapley values
Pl.5  Pl.3  Pl.4  Pl.1  Pl.2
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Table 6: Comparison between the Shapley values.
Player{i} S.V. in η(S,wcard) S.V. in η(S,wpre)
1 0, 465 0, 436
2 0, 451 0, 425
3 0, 507 0, 519
4 0, 491 0, 502
5 0, 563 0, 594
which therefore seems to be robust enough to the choice of system weights.
Also, the weight system wpre amplifies the difference in the Shapley values
obtained with wcard, yielding a higher variance for the values’ distributions.
5 Concluding remarks
In the previous section we described a couple of algorithms that return
maxmin values and partitions in both competitive and cooperative settings.
It is important to note that we could think of the same procedures as interac-
tively implemented between (coalitions of) players and an impartial referee.
At first the referee proposes a division of the cake based on the maxsum
division of the cake with equal weights for all players. The players now re-
port their utilities and the referee corrects the inequalities in the division by
proposing a new maxsum division with modified weights: Players who were
better off will be given a smaller weight and those who were worst off will see
their weight increase. Of course, one cannot hope to achieve the same degree
of precision, since the algorithm performs that step dozens of times, but the
bounds described in Section 3 give a precise idea on how far the proposed
division is from the desired one.
Many issues remain open. We hint at two of them.
• In the numerical example it would be interesting to link the Shap-
ley value rankings to the original system of preferences. What makes
Players 5 and 3 the most powerful players in the cooperative division
process? Apparently the two utility functions have different features:
Player 5’s distribution is uniform over the unit interval and his density
is maximal only at the very ends of the interval. On the other hand,
Player 3’s preferences are concentrated at the second half of the inter-
val – where he has no competitors, except player 5 (who, however, has
18
a smaller density). No simple explanation could be provided so far.
• Beyond the convergence of the algorithms, which end in a finite number
of steps, returning the approximate solution up to a specified degree
of precision, it would be interesting to investigate about the computa-
tional efficiency of the same algorithms
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